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State v. Thomas and the McDonough Test:
A Safety Net Proposal to Cure the
Square Peg-Round Hole Dilemma
Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments t o the United States Constitution, criminal defendants are guaranteed due
process of law, which includes the right to trial by an impartial
jury.' The voir dire process is one method by which our legal
system attempts to empanel impartial jurors who will consider
the accused innocent unless evidence presented in court proves
otherwise. Any bias revealed by answers to voir dire questioning can just* excusing a potential juror for cause.' A party
suspecting bias may exercise a peremptory challenge to excuse
a juror not excused for cause.3
In McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood: the
United States Supreme Court established a two-pronged test t o
determine whether allegations of juror dishonesty during voir
dire are sufficient to warrant a new trial. To receive a new
trial, "a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid
basis for a challenge for cause."

1. U.S. CONST.amends. VI, XIV, $ 1. The Sixth Amendment states that "the
accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US. 145, 149 (1968), the Supreme Court
applied this right to state criminal proceedings under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. Although the right to a jury trial applies only to criminal
proceedings, see Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984) (dictum), petty
criminal offenses have been traditionally tried without juries.
2. The requirements for challenges for cause in federal civil cases are delineated in 28 U.S.C. $ 1870 (1988). Utah's equivalent requirements for challenges for
cause in state civil cases are stated in UTAH R. CIV. P. 47(f) (1993); challenges for
cause in criminal cases are addressed in UTAH R. CRIM.P. 18(e) (1993).
3. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a party need not provide a reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. Id.
a t 220. Subsequent cases have since placed some restrictions on the use of peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (disallowing peremptory challenges showing a pattern of racial discrimination).
4. 464 U.S. 548 (1984).
5. Id. at 556.
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In State v. T h o m ~ sa, ~Utah criminal case, the McDonough
test was applied7 to determine whether "the failure of two jurors to disclose their prior experiences deprived [the defendant]
of his constitutional right to an impartial jury and a fair triaY8 During deliberation, other jurors learned of their fellow
jurors' nondisclosures during the voir dire process. The court
was forced to decide whether the jury's deliberative process
should be examined i n determining whether the jurors'
nondisclosures had resulted in prejudice related to their misconduct at voir dire.g Unable to command a majority, three of
the five Utah Supreme Court justices wrote separate opinions
which concurred in granting a new trial, but differed in reasoning and analysis.1°
Thomas illustrates the malleability of the McDonough test
and the M c u l t y of applying it in a consistent manner to the
post-trial determination of whether a juror's nondisclosure
during voir dire resulted in prejudicial bias. Part I1 of this Note
reviews McDonough and the two-pronged test it established.
Part I11 examines the facts and reasoning of Thomas. Part IV
analyzes the Utah Supreme Court's various applications of the
McDonough test to Thomas and proposes a "safety net" policy
which would allow courts to rule in favor of the party requesting a new trial when faced with the occasional extreme case in
which the established tests cannot satisfactorily resolve questions concerning the fairness of the trial process.

6. 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992).
7. Although McDonough was a civil case, the test has been applied to criminal trials. See Ian C. Wiener & Jeff E. Schwartz, hoject, Tzuentieth Annual Review
of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 19891990: Right to Jury Trial, 79 GEO. L.J. 982, 999 n.1777 (1991). Some criminal
cases applying McDonough include United States v. O'Neill, 767 F.2d 780 (11th
Cir. 1985), and United States v. McMahan, 744 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1984).
The Utah Supreme Court could not abrogate any right the defendant might
have to a new trial under McDonough; however, state rules and statutes, as well
as state concerns regarding judicial eamomy, allow the court the freedom to establish its own rules expanding a party's right to a new trial.
8. 830 P.2d at 244.
9. Id. a t 248-49 (opinion of Durham, J.); zd. a t 249 (Stewart, J., concurring
in the result); id. at 252 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 245-49 (opinion of Durham, J.); id. at 249-50 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result); id. at 250 (Zimmeman, J., concurring in the result); id. a t 25052 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting).
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A. Facts and Holding
McDonough involved a products liability action arising
from an accident in which a riding mower ran over a child,
causing the loss of both feet." During voir dire, plaintiffs'
counsel asked prospective jurors whether they or any of their
family members had sustained any accidental injury resulting
in prolonged suffering or disability.'' One juror did not respond to this question, even though his son had once suffered a
broken leg, because the juror did not believe that his son's
injury resulted in extended suffering or disability.13 After the
jury ruled in defendant's favor, the plaintiffs approached the
juror with the trial court's permission and moved for a new
trial.14 The trial court denied the motion, but was never informed of the results of the interview with the juror? The
plaintiffs appealed the judgment, claiming that their right to
invoke peremptory challenges had been prejudiced by the
juror's silence? The Tenth Circuit agreed and ordered a new
trial." The defendants appealed, and in an opinion written by
Justice Rehnquist, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
After acknowledging that harmless-error rules incorporate
the principle that "courts should . . . ignore errors that do not
affect the essential fairness of the trial,"18 the Court held that
a new trial was not required in McDonough unless the juror's
nondisclosure "denied respondents their right to an impartial
jury."lg The Court then set forth a two-pronged test for determining when a juror's failure to disclose information during
voir dire requires a new trial.20
11. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 US. 548, 549, 558 n.*
(1984).
12. Id. at 549-50.
13. Id. at 550, 555.
14. Id. at 550-51.
15. Id. at 551.
16. Id.
17. Greenwood v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 687 F.2d 338, 342-43 (10th
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 464 U.S. 548 (1984).
18. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 553 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 759-60 (1946)).
19. Id. at 549.
20. See infra part 1I.B. In deciding the McDomugh case, the courts treated
the juror's silence as an answer to voir dire questioning. McDomugh, 464 U.S. at
551-52. Factors for determining whether silence constitutes a response are found in
McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1981). If a juror's silence dem-
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B. The McDonough Test
The McDonough test replaced the more subjective standard
used by the Tenth Circuit, which required a new trial whenever a juror failed to disclose information that would have provided evidence of a probable bias, if such information would have
been disclosed by an average juror.21 The Supreme Court emphasized that trial error should not automatically be grounds
for a new trial,22and declared the standard used by the Tenth
Circuit to be "contrary to the practical necessities of judicial
management."z3 This statement finds support in Rule 61 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedurez4 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2111:~ which emphasize that trial error does not require a
new trial unless a party's substantial rights have been affected.
The first prong of the McDonough test requires proof that
a juror "failed to answer honestly a material question on uoir
dire."26The plain language of this prong does not differentiate
between a juror's intentional or knowing dishonesty and a
juror's inadvertent but mistaken response or nondisclosure.
However, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated that
although "[tlhe motives for concealing information may
vary, . . . only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality
can truly be said t o affect the fairness of a trial."27 This
statement implies that bias cannot be presumed from a juror's
onstrates failure to answer honestly a material question, the nondisclosure constitutes juror misconduct which may require a new trial, depending on the extent to
which the nondisclosure affected the fairness of the trial. See McDonough, 464 U.S.
at 549, 556.
21. Greenwood, 687 F.2d at 343. This standard protected a party's right to
exercise peremptory challenges based upon the possibility of juror bias.
22. McDonough, 464 US. at 553.
23. Id. at 555-56.
24. This rule requires that a party's substantial rights be affected in order to
justify a new trial:
No error . . . or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or
omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a
unless refusal to take such
new trial or for setting aside a verdict
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court
at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
FED.R. CW. P. 61.
25. This statute provides that, "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affed the substantial rights
of the parties." 28 U.S.C. 8 2111 (1988).
26. McDomugh, 464 US. at 556.
27. Id.

...
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nondisclosure, but that an appellant must prove that the failure to disclose rendered the juror unfit for jury service; consequently, there may be situations in which a court must probe
the juror's mental state.28
The second prong of the McDonough test requires proof
that an honest response would have provided grounds for a
challenge for cause.2gThe Court explicitly declined to extend
this prong t o the possible exercise of a peremptory challenge.
Justice Rehnquist stated that "it ill serves the important end of
finaity to wipe the slate clean simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process because counsel lacked an item of information which objectively he should have obtained from a juror on
voir dire exa~nination."~~
In his concurrence, joined by Justices Stevens and
O'Connor, Justice Blackmun specifically stated it was his understanding that the Court's decision did not "foreclose the
normal avenue of relief available to a party who is asserting
that he did not have the benefit of an impartial jury.'"' Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote an opinion
concurring in the judgment only." Under his analysis, "the
proper focus when ruling on a motion for new trial in this situation should be on the bias of the juror and the resulting
prejudice t o the litigant."33 Justice B r e ~ a nargued that a
new trial should be awarded if a "juror incorrectly responded t o
a material question on voir dire, and [ifJ, under the facts and
circumstances surrounding the particular case, the juror was

28. David Crump, Peremptory Challenges After McDonough Power Equipment,
Inc. v. Greenwood: A Problem of Fairness, Finality, and Falsehood, 69 OR. L. REV.
741, 772 (1990). According to Crump, this type of inquiry into the juror's mental
state could 'lengthen hearings, make outcomes depend more heavily upon vague
inferences from diffise evidence, and increase juror harassment." Id. However,
Crump believes that the McDonough test's requirement of dishonesty in a response
to questioning, wherein a juror intends to mislead the court or knows the given
response did mislead the court, should be retained in any modification of the test.
Crump's reason for adhering to this requirement is that mistaken juror responses-such as those resulting from mistake, ineffective communication, or a juror's
imperfect knowledge or understanding-are almost always found in "fair-but-imperfect trials." Id. at 772-73. Furthermore, the requirement of dishonesty provides
an incentive for voir dire questioning to be brief, clear, and focused "on the most
likely sources of bias." Id. at 773.
29. McDonough, 464 U.S.at 556.
30. Id. at 555.
31. Id. at 556 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 557 (Breman, J., concurring in the judgment).
33. Id.
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biased against the moving litigant."34 Brennan's standard
would not limit a new trial to those situations in which the
juror intentionally gives an incorrect or dishonest answer during voir dire; according to Justice Brennan, "[olne easily can
imagine cases in which a prospective juror provides what he
subjectively believes to be an honest answer, yet that same
answer is objectively incorrect and therefore suggests that the
individual would be a biased juror in the particular case."35
Taking all the opinions in McDonough as a whole, every
Justice agreed in the result and determined that the trial
court, not the court of appeals, should have decided the new
trial question? Furthermore, five Justices argued in concurrences that trial courts should have the discretion to infer bias
from the facts and circumstances of the case despite a juror's
honest^.^' This suggests that a majority of the Court did not
favor the McDonough test as an exclusive test of impartiality.
It appears that, when challenging a decision on the basis of
juror nondisclosure, the McDonough test is required only when
bias cannot be shown.
In addressing a party's right to an impartial jury, the
McDonough test focuses on the issue of juror bias sufficient to
justify a challenge for cause. "[Hlints of bias not sufficient t o
warrant challenge for cause,"38 although they might influence
a litigant's decision t o exercise a peremptory challenge,sg do
not automatically justify rever~al.4~

34. Id. at 557-58 (Breman, J., concurring in the judgment).
35. Id. at 559 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
36. Id. at 556, 557.
37. Id. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 557 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
38. Id. at 554.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 555-56. Other courts have also used the "presumed bias" reasoning
of the concurring opinions in McDonough. Crump, supm note 28, at 762 n.114,
cites several cases which were decided by using the less rigid reasoning of the
concurring opinions in McDonough rather than that of the majority opinion. See,
e.g., United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1989) (remanding for hearing
when &davit charged juror with nondisclosure at voir dire because she wanted to
serve on the jury); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1988) (reversing
conviction by applying presumed bias reasoning to reverse district court's finding of
juror's sincerity in nondisclosure).
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111. STATEV. THOMAS:
THEUTAHSUPREME
COURT'S
APPLICATIONAND INTERPRETATION
OF THE MCDONOUGH
TEST
A. Facts
In State v. Thomas:' defendant Thomas appealed his conviction of rape, alleging four counts of trial error. One assignment of error was "that the failure of two jurors to correctly
respond to a question during voir dire denied him a fair trial by
an impartial
During voir dire, the judge asked prospective jurors whether they or any close relatives had ever
been the victim of a violent crime, and whether they or any
close relatives had ever been accused of any offense similar to
the rape charge against ThomasP3 Juror Salaz, who had previously been assaulted, and juror Wall, who had told police that
her husband had sexually assaulted her son, remained silent
and did not inform the judge of these experiences."
Thomas claimed that during jury deliberation, the other
jurors learned of Salaz's and Wall's undisclosed experiencesp5
and coerced Salaz and Wall into changing their votes from not
guilty t o guilty by threatening to reveal their misconduct during voir dire.46 Thomas also argued that the nondisclosures
had prevented him from excusing the jurors on challenges for
cause or peremptory challenges, and that he had therefore been
deprived of his right t o an impartial jury4' Despite Thomas's
assertions, the trial judge refused to admit post-trial evidence
regarding these allegations on the ground that it would constitute "an intrusion on the deliberative process of the jury, in
violation of rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of E ~ i d e n c e . " ~ ~

41. 777 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989).
42. Id. at 447.
43. State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992).
44. Id. at 244.
45. Id. at 244, 247.
46. Id.
47. 777 P.2d a t 450. The Utah Constitution guarantees defendants the right
to a speedy trial by an impartial jury. UTAH CONST. art. I, 5 12.
48. 777 P.2d at 447. Rule 60603) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states the following:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
may not testify a s to any matter or statement occurring during the
course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or
any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to
or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental
processes in c o ~ e c t i o ntherewith, except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
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On Thomas's first appeal, the Utah Supreme Court remanded the case t o the trial court t o determine whether Thomas could prove that both prongs of the McDonough test had
On remand, the trial judge denied Thomas's
been ~atisfied.~'
motion for a new trial after holding an evidentiary hearing.s0
The judge found that the first prong of the McDonough
test-that a prospective juror failed to answer honestly a material question during voir dire-was not satisfiedeslThe judge
apparently believed that neither juror had intended her silence
and again refused to admit any evito mislead the
Thomas
dence showing jury misconduct during deliberati~n.~~
appealed a second time, and the Utah Supreme Court reversed
and remanded for a new triales4

B. Reasoning
1. The court's application of the McDonough test's first prong
Although the court found juror Wall had not intended t o
deceive the court by failing to disclose that she had charged her
husband with sexually assaulting her son,55 it determined
that Wall's nondisclosure satisfied the first prong of the
McDonough test because "she nonetheless failed to answer a
material question ac~urately."~~
Justice Durham considered
the possibility that Wall may not have perceived any similarity
between her husband's alleged sexual assault on her son and
the crime of rape.s7 In Durham's view, this was one of those
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or
evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which
the juror would be precluded from testifjing be received for these purposes.
UTAHR. EVID. 60603).
49. 777 P.2d at 451.
50. 830 P.2d at 244.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 245.
53. Id. at 244.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 245-46.
56. Id. at 246. The dissent in Thomas, written by Associate Chief Justice
Howe and joined by Chief Justice Hall, maintained that the first prong of the
McDonough test had not been met for juror Wall since no evidence was submitted
to prove that the charge against Wall's husband of sexually assaulting her son was
a crime of violence rather than "a nonconsensual touching or fondling unaccompanied by violence." Id. at 251 (Howe, Assoc. C.J.,dissenting).
57. Id. at 246.

13471

STATE v. THOMAS

1355

"easily imagine[dIn cases where subjective belief was unreasonable. Relying upon the objective perspective proposed by
Brennan? Justice Durham stated "there are obvious similarities between a sexual assault and a rapeYsg and argued that
Wall's intent or lack of intent to deceive the court was irrelevant; her failure to accurately answer a material question during voir dire was sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the
McDonough test.60
As to juror Salaz, her testimony during the evidentiary
hearing showed that "[slhe knew that she had been a victim of
a violent crime and, substituting her judgment for that of court
and counsel, decided that she could be impartial and did not
Justice Durham held that,
need to disclose the inf~rmation."~'
in accordance with the court's past decisions, "the trial court,
not the juror, must determine a juror's qualification^."^ The
court found that Salaz's nondisclosure also satisfied the first
prong of the McDonough test since "Salaz's subjective impression that she could be fair and impartial [did] not overcome the
fact that she had been a victim of a violent crime and failed t o
disclose that fact during voir dire."3 For these reasons, the
court held that the trial judge had been clearly erroneous in
ruling that the first prong of the McDonough test had not been
met.64
-

-

2. McDonough's second prong: Four different views

The Utah Supreme Court justices were signifkantly divided over the application of the second prong of the McDonough
test and their understanding of its effect on the facts of Thomas. Justice Durham modified the second prong of the test in
order to justify a new trial.65 Justices Stewart and
Zimmerman concurred in remanding the case for a new trial,
but disagreed with Justice Durham's extension of the
McDonough test's second prong; each gave different reasons for

58. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
59. 830 P.2d at 246.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 246-47.
62. Id. at 247.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 245. In the dissent, Associate Chief Justice Howe and Chief Justice
Hall favored a subjective analysis for determining juror dishonesty. Id. at 251
(Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 247-49 (opinion of Durham, J.).
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determining that a new trial was required.66 The dissent argued that application of the unaltered McDonough test did not
justify a new trial.67
a. Justice Durham's opinion. Under the second prong of
the McDonough test, Thomas could not have been granted a
new trial unless he proved that the jurors' honest answers to
the voir dire questions would have been grounds for challenges
for cause? Justice Durham believed that Thomas could not
do so because "there [was] no record establishing a basis for
this challenge, nor [was] there any way t o show that proper
disclosure by the jurors would have created such a basis."'
In accordance with the "outside influence" exception to rule
606(b),?' Thomas had also tried to show he had been prejudiced by the jury's use of Wall's and Salaz's nondisclosure^.^^
Since the alleged prejudice did not originate from any bias of
the two jurors who failed to answer honestly the questions at
voir dire, Thomas sought to prove that prejudice resulted from
the reactions of Wall and Salaz to the coercive behavior of their
fellow jurors, who "threat[ened] to reveal their misc~nduct."'~
Justice Durham argued that the trial judge's refusal to admit
evidence of the jury's "prejudicial use of the voir dire-related
information during jury deliberations" prevented Thomas from
proving the existence of this prejudice."
For these reasons, Justice Durham concluded that the
second prong of the McDonough test could not be satisfied for
either Wall or S a l a ~ . ?In~ order to address the situation presented by Thomas's case, Justice Durham modified the second
prong of the test "to require a showing that a correct response
would have provided either a valid basis for a challenge for
cause or that the nondisclosure itself prevented the juror from
serving as a fair, impartial fa~tfinder."~~
To satisfy this modi-

66. Id. at 249-50 (Stewart, J., & Zirnmerman, J., concurring in th~-result).
67. Id. at 250-52 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 245 (opinion of Durham, J.).
69. Id. at 247 (opinion of Durham, J.).
70. See supra note 48.
71. 830 P.2d at 247.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 248-49 (opinion of Durham, J.).
74. Id. at 247-49 (opinion of Durham, J.).
75. Id. at 248 (opinion of Durham, J.). Modification of the Supreme Court's
McDomugh test is not unprecedented. In United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519
(11th Cir. 1984), a defendant convicted of both obstruction of justice and conspiracy
to obstruct justice was granted a new trial based upon a juror's dishonest answers
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fied prong of the test, Thomas could introduce evidence that
jury misconduct relating to the nondisclosures at voir dire occurred during jury deliberati~n.~~
Even though the trial judge
had refused to admit such evidence, Justice Durham thought
"[elvidence that the undisclosed information was used during
deliberations should be admissible under the provision of rule
606(b) allowing testimony on the question 'whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.' "77
Justice Durham apparently felt justified in departing from
the policy favoring secrecy in jury deliberations when juror
misconduct during voir dire results in misconduct by other
jurors during deliberations. Although she acknowledged that
"harassment, pressure, o r intimidation from other jurors is not
she then argued that this
a basis for impeaching a verdi~t,"~'
traditional rule should be different "[wlhere the pressure is
based on the other jurors' improper use of a juror's misconduct
during voir dire" because such a situation implicates "the fairness of the trial process."7s Justice Durham would have remanded for trial court proceedings under her new test, but
since no other justice joined her proposed modification, she concurred in remanding the case for a new trial.80
b. Justice Stewart's opinion. Although Justice Stewart
agreed that a new trial was required, he did not believe that "a
jury verdict should be impeachable on the basis of what was
said during the jury's deliberations."'' He supported the reversal of Thomas's conviction because, if Wall and Salaz had responded honestly to the voir dire questioning, their answers
would have been grounds for peremptory challenges and possibly challenges for cause.82
to voir dire. The Eleventh Circuit resolved the McDonough test's second prong
requirement--that an honest response would have provided a basis for a challenge
for cause-by quoting Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in McDonough, not the
plurality opinion. Justice Blackmun's concurrence stated that "in most cases, the
honesty or dishonesty of a juror's response is the best initial indicator of whether
the juror in fact was impartial." Id. at 1532 (quoting McDonough Power Equip.,
Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). Note,
however, that while McDonough is wholly binding authority on the Eleventh Circuit, only its constitutional requirements are binding on the Utah Supreme Court.
76. 830 P.2d at 248 (opinion of Durham, J.).
77. Id at 249 (opinion of Durham, J.) (quoting UTAHR. EVID.606(b)).
78. Id. at 247 n.2 (opinion of Durham, J.) (citations omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 249 (opinion of Durham, J.).
81. Id. at 249 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
82. Id.

1358 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNZVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

c. Justice Zirnmerman's opinion. Justice Zimmerman
agreed with Justice Stewart's criticism of the modification
proposed by Justice Durham, but felt that the original
McDonough test was sufficient to determine whether a new
trial should be granted.83Justice Zimmerman argued that a
basis for a challenge for cause would have been found had Wall
and Salaz given honest responses to the voir dire questions,
because another potential juror in Thorns had been excused
for cause after disclosing an experience involving assault."
Justice Zimmerman interpreted "basis" to mean creating "a
prima facie case for a motion to disqualify for cause,"85or taking the undisclosed answer alone, without regard to what the
trial court might have learned from follow-up questions.86Justice Zimmerman recognized that, "after the fad, the jurors may
state that they still could have judged the case impartially,"
but felt that "such retrospective second-guessing" was inappropriate and not required by M~Donough.~'
d. The dissent. Associate Chief Justice Howe, joined by
Chief Justice Hall, disagreed with the analyses of Justices
Durham, Stewart, and Zimmerman. In rejecting Justice
Durham's extension of the second prong of the McDonough test,
Justice Howe maintained that admitting affidavits of jurors
relating details of the jury's deliberations would violate rule
606(b) of the Utah Rules of E v i d e n ~ e He
. ~ ~claimed that the
test in its original form was "eminently fair to both the prosecution and the defe~~dant."~'
In his dissent, Justice Howe argued that Thomas's conviction should have been a r m e d and that no new trial was warrantedegO
He felt that Wall's nondisclosure did not satisfy the
f i s t prong of the McDonough test because the sexual assault
Wall had accused her husband of perpetrating on her son may

83. Id. at 250 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result).
84. Id. The potential juror told the court that she had been the victim of a
sexual assault, and indicated that she might have difficulty remaining impartial.
Brief for Appellant at 15, State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992) (No. 890503);
cf. infra note 96 and accompanying text (explaining that a juror whose brother had
been the victim of a violent assault had not, a h r follow-up questioning, been challenged for cause, and was allowed to serve on the jury).
85. 830 P.2d at 250 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 252 (Howe, Assoc. CJ., dissenting).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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not have been a violent crime.g1As Justice Howe argued, "[aln
assault can be a nonconsensual touching or fondling unaccomFor this reason, Justice Howe did not
panied by ~iolence."'~
find clearly erroneous the trial judge's determination that Wall
had responded h~nestly.'~
Although Justice Howe agreed that the fvst prong of the
McDonough test had been met in regard t o Salaz, he maintained that "a challenge for cause against Salaz would not have
In support of this position, he stated that,
been ~ustained."'~
We have held in many cases that a prospective juror is not
subject to a challenge for cause because he or she may harbor
preconceived notions, feelings, or ideas which will fairly yield
to the evidence t o be presented. Particularly is that true when
the juror, without being "pushed" by the court, indicates his
or her willingness to do so."

Supporting this argument is the fact that another juror, who
had disclosed the facts of his brother's murder by an unknown
assailant but who nonetheless asserted his ability to serve
impartially, was not challenged for ~ a u s e . ' ~

3. Reconciling the opinions in Thomas
The confusion in Thomas may be attributed t o a resultoriented approach. However, the opinions can be substantially
reconciled. First, a majority of the court agreed to apply the
unaltered version of the McDonough test's second prong.97
Second, a majority consisting of a different grouping of justices
found that the facts of Thomas satisfied some variant of the
second prong." Third, a majority of the justices apparently

91. Id. at 251 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 251-52 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting); see also Brief for Appellee at
2, Stalx v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992) (No. 890503) (giving a more detailed
account of this juror's history and the decision to allow him to serve on the jury);
supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that another pot&tial
juror had been excused for cause after telling the court that she had been the
victim of a crime of violence).
97. 830 P.2d at 250 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result); id. at 250-51
(Howe, Assoc. C.J., joined by Hall, C.J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 249 (opinion of Durham, J.); id. at 249-50 (Stewart, J., concurring
in the result); id. at 250 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result).
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felt that the facts of Thomas did not satisfy the second prong if
the phrase "valid basis" considers more than just the omitted
response.gg Taken together, the opinions limit the unaltered
second prong t o consideration of whether the omitted response,
if unrebutted, would justify a juror's disqualification for cause.
While only Justice Zimmerman took this position,'" his approach provides the narrowest possible grounds on which the
court's opinions could rest. lo'
IV. ANALYSISAND PROPOSAL
The Thomas decision involves two separate issues. The
first issue, which McDonough adequately addresses, asks when
juror dishonesty or nondisclosure during voir dire requires a
new trial. The second issue, which McDonough did not address,
asks when-if ever-jury misconduct during deliberation, when
prompted by juror misconduct during voir dire, requires a new
trial.
The McDonough test deals with juror misconduct during
voir dire that prejudices a party's ability to wisely exercise a
challenge for cause or a peremptory challenge. Under the
McDonough test, juror dishonesty at voir dire requires a new
trial only when it affects a party's substantial rights and would
have provided sficient grounds for a challenge for cause.
In Thomas, a question arose as t o whether Wall's and
Salaz's nondisclosures at voir dire concealed juror bias which
would have justified a challenge for cause. However, apparently
neither juror was actually biased against Thomas because both
initially voted to find him not
Any prejudice arising
99. Id. at 247 (opinion of Durham, J.) (arguably implying by her "no record"
discussion that the test might not be satisfied if more than the omitted response
were considered); id. at 251-52 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., joined by Hall, C.J., dissenting)
(discussing other jurors not excused after follow-up questioning).
100. Id. at 250 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). Note that Justice
Durham's "no record" discussion might also suggest a reluctance to second-guess
what might have followed disclosure, had it been made. Id. at 247 (opinion of
Durham, J.). Note also that Justice Stewart, in stating that "the answers, if truly
given, m a y not have been a ground for a challenge for cause," did not foreclose the
possibility that the nondisclosures justified a challenge for cause. Id. at 249 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (emphasis added).
101. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds . . . .' ") (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 11.15 (1976)).
102. 830 P.2d at 247, 248.
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from their misconduct during voir dire did not manifest itself in
any predetermined verdict on their part; instead, it resulted
when other jurors used their knowledge of the nondisclosures
to influence Wall's and Salaz's votes.lo3
Because the pressure applied to Wall and Salaz was based
on the other jurors' knowledge of Wall's and Salaz's misconduct
during voir dire, the McDonough test might appear relevant to,
although not dispositive of, the situation. However, a juror's
testimony concerning events that occur during the deliberative
process falls under rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence? The conflicting opinions in Thomas are the result of
the Utah Supreme Court's attempt to apply both the
McDonough test and rule 606(b) to this situation.

A. The Square Peg-Round Hole Dilemma
Does juror misconduct at voir dire constitute "an outside
influence" or "extraneous prejudicial information7'affecting jury
deliberation? If so, evidence that such information was used
during deliberation should be admissible under the exception to
rule 606(b).lo5If not, the evidence is inadmissible because it
"would constitute an impermissible intrusion into the deliberative process of the jury."'06 The Thomas court struggled t o determine just how relevant the McDonough test was-or should
be-in resolving this question.

B. Justice Durham's Extension of McDonough
Adopting Justice Durham's modification of the McDonough
test could result in a multitude of problems and uncertainties.
Determining whether "the nondisclosure itself prevented the
juror from serving as a fair, impartial fa~tfinder"'~'would necessitate inquiry into the juror's performance of jury duties.
The search for juror bias would extend beyond pre-trial procedures to the trial itself, intrude upon the jury's deliberative
process, and continue long after the trial's conclusion. While
Justice Durham sought to protect "the fairness of the trial proa party to inquire into a juror's impartiality
c e ~ s , " 'allowing
~~
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.

See supra note 48.
See supra note 48.
830 P.2d at 248 (opinion of Durham, J.).
Id.
Id. at 247 n.2 (opinion of Durham, J.).
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to such an extent would also affect the fairness of the trial process.
A delicate balance exists between the need for fmality of
verdicts and the interest in providing a fair trial. While the
parties, and society, must be able to rely on the finality of a
verdict, finality also relates t o the concept of a fair trial. One
commentator has persuasively argued that,
If a verdict is impeached and the judgment set aside, it may
be years before the case is retried . . . . As time passes, memories fade, witnesses become unavailable, and evidence is often
lost . . . . Due to these problems, it is uncertain whether a
later retrial is likely to result in a just verdict.'"

On the other hand, "if a verdict is the result of threats against
jurors, outside or erroneous information provided t o jurors, or
other improper influences, the parties have not received the
just and impartial verdict t o which they are entitled."l1°
Although the McDonough test was properly applied in
Thomas to discover whether Wall or Salaz acted improperly
during voir dire, the test was not intended t o resolve the question of whether a new trial should be granted based upon jury
misconduct during deliberation. In seeking t o ensure the fairness of one aspect of the trial process, courts should be wary of
compromising the fairness of the trial process in other aspects.

C. Justice Stewart's Extension of McDonough
Rather than undermining the "long-established policy of
the law t o keep jury deliberations both secret and sacrosanct,""' Justice Stewart chose to modify the test in a manner which granted a new trial because the jurors'
nondisclosures deprived Thomas of his right to exercise pe-

109. James W. Diehm, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts: T a ~ e rv. United States
and Beyond, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.389, 402-03 (1991).
The need for finality is a generally recognized principle. "[Tlhe setting aside of
jury verdicts on any but the most egregious grounds would cost more in terms of
stability and finality than it could possibly gain." Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct,
Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusionary Principle of Rule 606@) Justified?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 509, 534 (1988). However, Crump
concedes that "an exclusionary rule preventing proof of serious misconduct, or a
rule preventing the investigation that would discover it, would be dysfunctional."
Id. at 535.
110. Diehm, supra note 109, at 403-04.
111. Thomas, 830 P.2d at 249 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
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remptory challenge^."^ Justice Stewart's modification of the
McDonough test grants a new trial if a nondisclosing juror's
honest response to voir dire questioning would have been
grounds for a challenge for cause or a peremptory challenge.
This would create a standard similar to that used by the Tenth
Circuit,ll3 prior to the establishment of the McDonough test,
in which the unrevealed information is so significant that counsel is "entitled to know of it in deciding how to use . . . peremptory challenge^.""^ In Thomas, Justice Stewart argued that,
The questions put to the jurors which were incorrectly answered were clearly material and potentially of great importance to an attorney's making a rational decision a s to how to
exercise peremptory challenges. Although it is true that the
answers, if truly given, may not have been a ground for a
challenge for cause, peremptory challenges are nonetheless an
essential and important part of choosing a jury.l15

Had Wall and Salaz responded honestly to the voir dire
questions, Thomas's attorney would probably have questioned
them further concerning their past experiences. Depending
upon their answers to more extensive questioning, it is certainly possible that the defense would have attempted to excuse
both jurors by exercising either challenges for cause or peremptory challenges. The defense should have had that opportunity.
Justice Stewart's proposed modification of the test is similar t o that suggested by Professor David Crump. According t o
Crump, the McDonough test "fails t o recognize how a juror's
frustration of the peremptory challenge process can lead to
unfairness in the trial."116 Crump's proposal retains the first

112. Id.
113. "If an average prospective juror would have disclosed the information, and
that information would have been significant and cogent evidence of the juror's
probable bias, a new trial is required to rectify the failure to disclose it." Greenwood v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 687 F.2d 338, 343 (10th Cir. 1982), rev'd,
464 U.S. 548 (1984).
114. Id. at 342.
115. Thomas,830 P.2d at 249 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (citing
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988)). The two types of challenges are
discussed in McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654, 657-58 (6th Cir. 1981). 'While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and
legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or
imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable." Id. at 657-58
(quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120
U.S. 68, 70 (1887))).
116. Crump, supra note 28, at 764. Crump claims that Justice Rehnquist's
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prong of the original test-that "a party must . . . demonstrate
that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on
voir dire9'"'-but modifies the second prong so that a new trial may be granted if "the average attorney of reasonable skill
would have been particularly likely to exercise a peremptory
challenge if provided with correct answer^.""^ This proposal
is more generous than the McDonough test in recognizing the
role of the peremptory challenge in selecting an impartial jury,
but is still sufficiently vague enough to cause inconsistent results.
D. The Combined Effect of the Opinions in Thomas
Justice Zimmerman's prima facie case analysis requires a
new trial if the unrebutted nondisclosure would have justified
disqualification for cause. Since, absent rebuttal, the jurors
would have been dismissed had they answered honestly, this
analysis requires a new trial. If this rule properly reconciles
the Justices' opinions, Thorns protects parties from jurors'
after-the-fact assurances of impartiality-assurances sought by
judges anxious to avoid repeating a trial. The prohibition on
using impartiality declared after the fact to deny a new trial is
similar t o the prohibition on using hints of bias t o justify granting a new trial.
E. The Safety Net
In effect, the McDonough test states that, when the lack of
an honest response to voir dire questioning results from a
juror's nondisclosure or inadvertent mistake, a party's substantial rights are not affected by the deprivation of any opportuni-

second prong of the McDonough test, requiring a finding that "a correct response
would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause," McDonough Power
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984), would often "preserve some
verdicts that many would find too glaringly unfair to tolerate." Crump, supra note
28, at 774. Crump finds that the concurring opinions in McDonough
propose too diffuse a standard in focusing merely on the bias of the juror
and the resulting prejudice to the litigant. By grounding this standard
upon multiple unspecified fadors, these Justices would encourage hearings
in marginal cases, cause an undue number of unproductive retrials,
lengthen hearings, produce unpredictable results, and increase juror harassment.
Id. at 774-75.
117. McDonough, 464 U.S.at 556 (emphasis added).
118. Crump, supra note 28, at 775.
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ty to exercise a peremptory challenge. This seems unjust, since
the inability t o exercise a peremptory challenge in such a situation might well compromise the essential fairness of a trial.
The McDonough test seeks to provide fairness in the trial process without creating judicial inefficiency. Had a less rigid
standard been applied to Thorns, a new trial could have been
ordered without intruding upon the jury's deliberative process
to impeach the verdict or interpreting and manipulating the
McDonough test in order to resolve the issue before the court.
The conflicting analyses and results of the Utah Supreme
Court justices in Thomas illustrate that the McDonough test
was not designed to address a situation involving such unusual
circumstances. Confusion and inconsistency will necessarily
occur when the courts attempt to force a square peg into a
round hole. Efforts t o resolve the occasional extreme case by
applying tests and standards which cannot encompass the facts
of the case are more likely to frustrate rather than administer
justice. Although a defendant is "not entitled to perfection in
the trial
the courts should provide a "safety net"
for the occasional extreme case in which questions concerning
the fairness of the trial process cannot be satisfactorily resolved
by established tests. When a court's reasonable efforts are
insufficient to conclusively establish that a party's substantial
rights have not been affected by trial error, the courts should
adopt a policy of ruling in favor of the moving party.120
Tests and standards are created t o address issues which
arise with some regularity. Most cases can be adequately resolved by the application of an established test. For these reasons, the safety net policy will not need to be used often. However, when a case presents facts which cannot be clearly resolved by a test or standard which would otherwise apply, the
safety net policy would allow the judicial system to decide a
case without risking the possibility of compromising the fairness of the trial process at some other stage of the proceedings.
This approach protects the integrity of the trial process and,

119. Commonwealth v. Amirault, 506 N.E.2d 129, 134 (Mass. 1987) (citing
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973)); see also McDonough, 464
U.S. at 553.
120. Accord United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 700 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating
that "in criminal cases '[dloubts about the existence of actual bias should be resolved against permitting the juror to serve' ") (quoting United States v. Nell, 526
F.2d 1223, 1230 (5th Cir. 1976)).
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when necessary, gives the benefit of the doubt to the moving
party
The McDonough test was designed to provide a new trial if
a juror who responded dishonestly to voir dire questioning
could have been challenged for cause had an honest response
been given. The various opinions in Thomas demonstrate the
difficulties courts have had in attempting to apply this test to
cases involving juror nondisclosure at voir dire, and in deciding
whether the "honesty" of a response should be determined from
a subjective or an objective standard. The Thomas case further
complicated the successful application of the McDonough test
by questioning the proper extent of any examination into juror
bias: should information affecting jury deliberations be scrutinized in order to determine juror prejudice related t o misconduct at voir dire?
Unusual cases such as Thorns are the exception rather
than the rule; however, they cannot be adequately resolved by
tests established to resolve less problematic situations. In trying to force a test to fit the facts of the occasional extreme case,
the courts are seldom able to achieve consistent and predictable
results, the integrity of the trial process is often compromised,
and justice is frequently not satisfied. These problems could be
reduced if the courts would adopt a safety net policy when they
are unable to satisfactorily resolve questions concerning the
fairness of the trial process by using an established test or
standard. The safety net policy would cause courts to rule in
favor of the party moving for a new trial when it cannot be
conclusively established that a party's substantial rights have
not been affected by trial error.
The trial process is at the very heart of our country's judicial system. In order to minimize the amount of trial error,
courts must sometimes take action which, while it may not
always be the correct result in a given case, will preserve the
procedures by which we attempt to provide due process of law
to the accused. The safety net policy proposed in this Note
would help insure a fair trial even in situations for which established tests are inadequate.

Lisabeth Joner
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